WASHINGTON – Intelligence officials made a crucial discovery this spring after tracking Ayman al-Zawahri, the leader of Al Qaeda, in Kabul, Afghanistan: He liked to read alone on the balcony of his home safe first thing in the morning.
Analysts look for this kind of life pattern intelligence, any habit the CIA can exploit. In al-Zawahri’s case, his long visits to the balcony gave the agency an opportunity to fire a clear missile that could avoid collateral damage.
The hunt for al-Zawahri, one of the world’s most wanted terrorists, dates back to before the 9/11 attacks. The CIA continued to search for him as he rose to the top of al Qaeda after the death of Osama bin Laden and after the Taliban took over Afghanistan last year. And a misstep during the pursuit, the recruitment of a double agent, led to one of the bloodiest days in the agency’s history.
Shortly after the United States left Kabul, the CIA intensified its efforts to find al-Zawahri, convinced that he would try to return to Afghanistan. Senior officials had told the White House that they would be able to maintain and build networks of informants inside the country from afar, and that the United States would not be blind to terrorist threats there. For the agency, finding al-Zawahri would be key proof of that claim.
This article is based on interviews with current and former US officials and others, independent analysts who have studied the hunt for decades and others briefed on the events leading up to the weekend strike. Most spoke on condition of anonymity because of sensitive intelligence used to find al-Zawahri.
For years al-Zawahri was thought to be hiding in Pakistan’s border area, where many Qaeda and Taliban leaders took refuge after the US invasion of Afghanistan in late 2001. He was wanted in connection with the Tanzanian and Kenyan embassy bombings of 1998. and the CIA had tracked down a network of people who intelligence officials thought supported him.
Scrutiny of that network intensified with the US withdrawal from Afghanistan last year and the belief among some intelligence officials that senior al Qaeda leaders would be tempted to return.
The hunch turned out to be right. The agency discovered that al-Zawahri’s family had returned to a safe house in Kabul. Although the family tried to ensure they were not under surveillance and to keep al-Zawahri’s location secret, intelligence agencies soon learned that he too had returned to Afghanistan.
“There was a renewed effort to find out where he was,” said Mick Mulroy, a former CIA officer. “The only good thing that could have come out of the withdrawal from Afghanistan is that certain high-level terrorist figures would believe it’s safe to be there.”
The safe house was owned by an aide to senior officials in the Haqqani network, a violent and battle-hardened wing of the Taliban government, and was in an area controlled by the group. Taliban leaders occasionally met at the house, but US officials do not know how many knew the Haqqanis were hiding al-Zawahri.
If some senior Taliban officials were unaware that the Haqqanis had allowed Al-Zawahri to return, his killing could drive a wedge between the groups, independent analysts and others briefed on the events said.
It is unclear why Al-Zawahri returned to Afghanistan. I had been making recruitment and promotional videos for a while, and it might have been easier to produce them in Kabul. You may also have had better access to medical treatment.
Whatever the reason, his ties to leaders of the Haqqani network led US intelligence officials to the safe house.
“The Haqqanis have a very long relationship with al Qaeda that goes back to the days of the Mujahideen,” said Dan Hoffman, a former CIA officer. “They give al Qaeda a lot of tactical support that they need.”
Once the safe house was located, the CIA followed the playbook he wrote during the hunt for bin Laden. The agency built a mock-up of the site and tried to learn everything about it.
Analysts eventually identified a figure who stayed on the balcony reading, but never left the house, like al-Zawahri.
American officials quickly decided to attack him, but the location of the house posed problems. It was in the Sherpur neighborhood of Kabul, an urban area of widely spaced houses. A missile armed with a high explosive could damage nearby houses. And any sort of incursion by Special Operations forces would be prohibitively dangerous, limiting the US government’s options for conducting a strike.
The search for al-Zawahri was of great importance to the agency. After the US invasion of Afghanistan, the CIA base in Khost province became home to a targeting group dedicated to tracking down both bin Laden and al-Zawahri. It was one of the leads developed by the CIA to track al-Zawahri that proved disastrous for the agency’s officers at that base, Camp Chapman.
CIA officers were hoping Humam Khalil Abu Mulal al-Balawi, a Jordanian doctor and al Qaeda propagandist, would lead them to al-Zawahri. He provided US officials with information about al-Zawahri’s health, convincing them that his intelligence was real. But he was in fact a double agent and on December 30, 2009, he showed up at Camp Chapman wearing a suicide vest. When it exploded, seven CIA officers were killed.
For many, the Khost attack intensified efforts to find al-Zawahri. “To honor his legacy, continue the mission,” said Mr. Hoffman.
In 2012 and 2013, the CIA focused its hunt on Pakistan’s North Waziristan region. CIA analysts were confident they had found the small town where al-Zawahri was hiding. But intelligence agencies were unable to find his home in the city of a dozen compounds, making a raid or drone strike impossible.
Still, the US hunt forced al-Zawahri to remain in Pakistan’s tribal areas, possibly limiting the effectiveness of his leadership within al Qaeda.
“Any time anything related to Bin Laden or Zawahri came into the intelligence channels, everyone would pitch in and help,” said Lisa Maddox, a former CIA analyst. “It was the CIA’s promise to the public: to bring them to justice.”
On April 1, top intelligence officials briefed White House national security officials about the safe house and how they had tracked al-Zawahri. After the meeting, the CIA and other intelligence agencies worked to learn more about what they called al-Zawahri’s pattern of life.
A key insight was that he was never seen leaving the house and only seemed to get some fresh air by standing on an upstairs balcony. He remained on the balcony for extended periods, giving the CIA a good opportunity to target him.
Al-Zawahri continued to work in the safe house, producing videos for distribution to the Qaeda network.
A senior administration official, who spoke on condition of anonymity to discuss the sensitive decisions leading up to the strike, said the intelligence presented to the White House had been reviewed repeatedly, including by a team of ‘independent analysts tasked with identifying all those staying at the White House. the safe house
As options for an attack developed, intelligence officials examined what type of missile could be fired at al-Zawahri without causing significant damage to the safe house or the surrounding neighborhood. They eventually settled on a form of Hellfire missile designed to kill a single person.
William J. Burns, the CIA director, and other intelligence officials briefed President Biden on July 1, this time using the safe house model, the senior official said.
In that meeting, Mr. Biden asked about the possibility of collateral damage, prompting Mr. Burns to retrace the steps of how the officers had found al-Zawahri and confirmed their information and their plans to kill him.
Mr. Biden ordered a series of tests. The White House asked the National Counterterrorism Center to provide an independent assessment of the impact of al-Zawahri’s removal, both in Afghanistan and on the network around the world, a senior official said of intelligence The president also asked about the possible risks to Mark R. Frerichs, an American hostage held by the Haqqani.
In June and July, officials met several times in the Situation Room to discuss the intelligence and examine potential ramifications.
The CIA’s plans called for it to use its own drones. Because it used its own assets, few Pentagon officials were involved in planning the strike, and many senior military officials learned about it shortly before the White House announcement, one official said.
On July 25, Mr. Biden, satisfied with the plan, authorized the CIA to carry out the airstrike when the opportunity presented itself. On Sunday morning in Kabul, it was. A drone flown by the CIA found al-Zawahri on his balcony. The agency’s operatives fired two missiles, ending a hunt of more than two decades.
Thomas Gibbons-Neff, Adam Goldman and Michael Crowley contributed to the report.