New documents obtained by CBC News provide a vivid chronology of the massive emergency response to the explosion and fire that killed six Eastway Tank Pump & Meter Ltd. employees. in Ottawa on January 13th.
The 44-page incident report, obtained through municipal freedom of information legislation, includes minute-by-minute shipping notes detailing not only how firefighters worked for hours in cold conditions to control the fire. volatile, but also its commanders ’concerns about the potential for secondary explosions, collapsing walls, and a stream of uncontained fuel flowing from industrial property to nearby railroad tracks.
The incident report also reveals the size and scope of the response to what would quickly become a rare five-alarm call.
It lists the 134 firefighters and their facilities: 20 bombs, four ladder trucks, four tower trucks and numerous other heavy equipment, so many that the commanders had to juggle the resources to make sure the rest of the city would be adequately covered in case of another. emergency.
Entries relating to the dead and injured have been separated from the documents in accordance with the legislation for the protection of individual privacy.
Eastway employees Rick Bastien, Danny Beale, Kayla Ferguson, Matt Kearney, Etienne Mabiala and Russell McLellan died as a result of the disaster.
Clockwise from top left, victims Matt Kearney, Etienne Mabiala, Danny Beale, Rick Bastien, Russell McLellan and Kayla Ferguson. (Photos sent)
First calls to 911
According to the submission notes, the first calls to 911 began shortly before 1:30 p.m. (the notes provide brief summaries of the communications, not textual transcripts).
“Lots of black smoke, flames shooting 50-60 [feet]. “
“Black smoke shooting from the roof.”
“Eastway Trucking Company”.
“The building could collapse by another person calling 911.”
“The caller reporting a fire spread all over the roof.”
“All stations notified”.
The first mention of the victims, which has been drafted, comes seconds later. Several more reports, apparently of people who have called 911 at the scene, are still in rapid succession.
At 1:36 p.m., Ottawa police are said to be setting up a perimeter around the burning building.
A rare fifth alarm was sounded just over an hour after the initial explosion, summoning firefighters from all over Ottawa. (David McEvoy / Bytown Fire Brigade)
About a minute later, the first team of firefighters, Pumper 25, arrives and approaches the north side of the burning building from an adjacent Petro Canada courtyard. The nearest of Petro Canada’s several large fuel storage tanks is just 50 meters away.
“Structuring completely [involved] at this point, “the dispatcher reports seconds later.
Enbridge and Hydro Ottawa are notified to close utilities and Pumper 25 calls for paramedics at the Eastway entrance, presumably to treat the victims.
The shipping notes offer an inside response to the Eastway tank explosion
Emergency services shipments on the day of the Eastway Tank explosion in January show the dangers and challenges firefighters faced as they tried to put out the flames.
‘Multiple dangers’
At 1:41 p.m., Pumper 25 has a hose running, but the crew is asking for help running a high-volume line to a hydrant on Merivale Road.
As more trucks arrive a second alarm is called, calling for more endowments at the scene.
At 1:43 p.m., Pumper 24 reports, “The roof is sagging; the walls will soon collapse.”
Bomb 24, from a nearby station that serves as one of Ottawa’s two hazardous material bases, issues a warning about hazardous fuels and chemicals inside the burning building: “There’s a lot of hydrocarbons in there.” .
In his internal statements filed eight days later, incident security officer Kip Muller noted “multiple dangers” at the scene, including a possible collapse of the wall, a propane heater on the south side of the building, a tanker truck that ran alongside the building and two more. tankers “possibly with flammable liquids or hazardous materials on board” parked inside service ships at the east end of the building.
A few seconds after the hydrocarbon warning, the office reports, “Strictly defensive fire. No crews inside.”
A ladder truck directs a stream of water into the flames on January 13th. The fire would not be declared under control until about 6 p.m. (Submitted by Murray Spencer)
Teams struggled to contain the flames
At 1:46 p.m., Pumper 34 is designated as the rapid response team to rescue injured or trapped firefighters, while Pumper 37 is tasked with “taking responsibility”: keeping track of which crews do what because no one gets lost.
Two minutes later, Pumper 23 confirms that the two-story store where the initial explosion is believed to have occurred is fully involved, but the crew “is trying to prevent it from reaching the 3rd section of the building,” which contains the four services. badies.
This diagram of the Eastway facility shows that the explosion appears to have occurred in the production area on the left, while the service area on the right remains standing. (CBC) This image of the drone shows the entrances through which the trucks entered the production area and the paint shop. (CBC)
At 1:52 p.m., a third alarm goes off, summoning two more firefighters, one more ladder truck, and one district chief.
A minute later, the shipment reports that teams are having trouble getting to the south side of the building due to a hose blocking access.
At 1:55 p.m., a district chief at the scene reports to command that there are “2-3 oil tankers inside the building.” Two minutes later, it is reported that the Insp. Jimmy Fata, a division chief, is on his way to the scene.
As the ladder trucks arrive and begin to settle in, a district chief orders the crews to direct their currents through the smoke rising toward the center of the burning building. These instructions continue throughout the afternoon and evening.
Water pressure was also a concern, as crews struggled to maintain the flow needed to put out the flames. At 2:07 p.m., the office reports that the city has been contacted to find out “who will respond from the water division.”
At the same time, a “unified command” site is established that includes Ottawa fire services, Ottawa police and paramedics in the parking lot of a commercial building across Merivale Road.
The collapse of the wall was feared
At 14:12, for fear of an imminent collapse of the wall, the security officer at the scene ordered an exclusion zone to be established on the south side of the building to prevent possible injuries to firefighters.
At 2:14 p.m., the office notifies crews that an Ottawa International Airport fire extinguisher foam truck is available if required. (The foam can be used to suppress “Class B” fires involving flammable liquids. The foam unit from the Ottawa Fire Department arrived at the scene at 2:08 a.m., according to the the incident.)
A few seconds after a fourth alarm sounded at 2:41 p.m., loud noises were heard from inside the burning building.
“A couple of tires blew up the platform inside,” the shipment reports.
This drone image released by Ottawa police shows the scale of the destruction. (Ottawa Police Service)
At 2:48 p.m., a rare fifth alarm goes off. Three minutes later, an ash wall on the south side of the building collapses on the roof of the first floor. A few minutes later, a district chief suggests that a “shovel” or excavator “may be useful … to redirect the fire,” and he contacts the city to ask how long it will take.
At 3:17 p.m., Pumper 31 reports, “Full flames in the new building: they become dangerous.” It is unclear which section of the Eastway building he is referring to.
Two minutes later, Pumper 12 reports a fuel fire on the south side of the building and asks crews to withdraw.
At the time, Via Rail asked if the tracks adjacent to the south side of the estate were “compromised.” A minute later, the order comes from the order to “close the VIA tracks.”
The fuel spill poses a new threat
As crews begin to attack the volatile fire with foam, a new danger arises: the spilled fuel is seen “rolling toward the parking lot, moving from east to west.” A crew reports “200 [metres] of fuel at the top of the train tracks, migrating in both directions “.
This would become a major concern as the afternoon progressed, as the contaminated liquid transformed the unpaved parking lot into a swamp.
“Get up on your knees in the water,” reports Pumper 24. “The yard isn’t draining well.”
Apparently, the city was worried too. “The city would like to know if fuel enters the basin,” the office reports at 3:29 p.m., probably referring to the ditch that separates Eastway property from the railroad tracks.
At 3:36 p.m., paramedics are looking for an injured firefighter, but are told to withdraw. Details of that incident have been drafted. There were no serious injuries among firefighters who responded to the Eastway explosion.
A few minutes later, the teams ask who is coming to drain the yard. It is also the first mention of any potential threat to a nearby residential area: “Now a high priority … Pouring into a neighborhood with wells.”
Dispatch is told to call the city’s road department to get hay bales “in order to block the fuel spill along the tracks”.
Chris Lawson, of the Office of the Fire Department, speaks to reporters on Jan. 14. (Francis Ferland / CBC)
Stubborn hot spots
At 3:49 p.m., crews who have entered the mostly intact service area are ordered to withdraw due to an impending collapse of the roof, but warn that “they are still dealing with hot spots.” Twelve minutes later they retreat to get a “drill bit,” which allows them to make a hole in the wall and fight the flames from outside the building.
For the next half hour, the crews continue to turn off the hot spots as directed by their “eye on the sky” in the bucket of a tower truck.
At 4:24 p.m., the office announces that a vehicle for hazardous materials from Station 24 is up and running. Around the same time, the teams begin a careful search of the perimeter of the building.
In this photo you can see the four service areas at the east end of the building. (Alexander Behne / CBC)
Pump 12 opens the door facing east of the paint shop and inspects the service spaces. “P12 confirms all 3 bays.” Minutes later, that section of the …