Five years ago, 72 people died in the Grenfell Tower fire. Britain was horrified as the flames engulfed a block of social housing in one of the richest areas of the country, and many knew that this disaster was much more than a strange accident.
In the days following the fire, residents talked about the dangerous conditions in which they lived and how the owner of the building, the Royal Borough of Kensington and Chelsea (RBKC), and its managing agent, Kensington and Chelsea, had rejected his security concerns. Chelsea Tenant Management Organization (KCTMO).
In the five years since the fire, the ongoing Grenfell Tower investigation has forensically examined the network of individual, corporate and government failures that caused one of the worst disasters in modern British history. Residents who repeatedly feared that their safety and well-being had not been taken into account have been repeatedly vindicated. The general public should be aware of the details of the investigation: not only does it tell the story of a totally avoidable tragedy in modern Britain, but it tells us that it could easily be repeated.
The first phase of the investigation, which took place during the second half of 2018, examined what happened on the night of the fire. He returned the crucial conclusion that the cladding installed in the tower as part of a refurbishment in 2015-16 was the main cause of the spread of the fire. The investigation also drew a vivid picture of ground chaos on the night of the fire, with the London Fire Brigade (LFB) receiving harsh criticism for the time it took to revoke its “stay” strategy. and start evacuating. residents.
The second phase of the investigation, which began in January 2020, is currently building an image of decades of how the tower ended up in such an unsafe condition in the first place. In doing so, he has highlighted the incompetence and malpractice within the construction industry, the housing sector, the fire brigade and the government of this country, both locally and nationally.
We first learned of the surprising lack of knowledge and respect for safety among architects, builders and specialist contractors involved in the renovation of the tower in 2015-16. This team made the decision to change the coating of the zinc building to plastic-filled aluminum composite material (ACM) to reduce costs. The austerity measures meant that the city inspector in charge of approving the reform managed 130 projects at a time.
At the time, the consultation focused on the manufacturers of products responsible for making the cladding and insulation used in the tower. We learned that the Arconic company tested in 2004 to show that its coating worked disastrously in a fire, but did not share these results with the product certifiers. Under questioning, the firm’s CEO admitted that the omission was tantamount to a “misleading half-truth”. However, the firm’s lawyers later regained that admission, blaming the language barrier between the consultation’s lawyers and the firm’s French general manager.
Meanwhile, a former employee of insulation manufacturer Celotex claimed that the company “stuck” a fire test to achieve better fire performance. The consultation also showed texts exchanged by employees of the insulation giant Kingspan joking about the “lies” of his company’s marketing material. Both firms have condemned the actions of individual employees, but maintain that they did not deliberately manipulate the evidence.
As the attention of the investigation shifted to RBKC and its tenant management organization, we learned that they both apparently failed in their duty to maintain the tower. In 2017, KCTMO had accumulated a backlog of hundreds of incomplete maintenance work resulting from fire risk assessments. RBKC rejected a recommendation from the LFB to repair and inspect fire doors in the municipality due to budget issues. Major fire safety equipment was not operating in Grenfell on the night of the fire and the broken fire doors allowed smoke to spread easily through the building.
The LFB has also not escaped further scrutiny in the second phase of the investigation. We learned how the brigade did not learn from previous disasters, especially the 2009 Lakanal House fire, and to prepare for an event like Grenfell, despite being aware of the growing concerns around the high-rise blocks badly built.
RBKC, KCTMO and LFB have apologized for their role in the Grenfell tragedy. However, the testimonies of these organizations have often sought to place their decisions within the context of the budgetary constraints imposed by the government at the time.
When officials and ministers responsible for fire safety in previous years in Grenfell were finally put under the microscope in March this year, we learned how successive governments since the 1990s have failed to control the growing security crisis. against fire in the United Kingdom. New Labor did not publish fire tests conducted in the early 2000s that showed ACM risk. A deregulation campaign under David Cameron meant that officials did not push for major amendments to building regulations.
Now in its 77th week, the second phase of the investigation has just examined the immediate aftermath of the fire, illustrating how Grenfell’s residents continued to be failed by the state in the weeks following the fire.
Over the past five years, research has uncovered an incredible amount of evidence on the corporate, legal, and governmental structures that led to the deaths of 72 people in a completely preventable disaster. However, this evidence means nothing if it does not lead to real change.
The survivors, former residents and villains of Grenfell Tower have campaigned tirelessly to ensure that this tragedy is not repeated. An important milestone was reached last week when the government released its long-awaited social housing regulation bill, which will massively strengthen the regulation of social landlords.
However, the pace of change has been painfully slow. The government has yet to implement most of the recommendations in the first phase of the investigation and recently announced that it will reject a key recommendation that building owners prepare personal evacuation plans for residents with disabilities.
Meanwhile, there are still 111 high-rise buildings with ACM cladding across England where repair work has not yet been completed, while thousands of people still live in flats with other types of hazardous cladding and safety defects.
Five years later, the tragedy of Grenfell continues to occupy an important place in our collective memory. It remains to be seen whether it will become a real turning point.
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Lucie Heath is the assistant news editor for Inside Housing
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