It took almost five years, but public investigation into the Westray mine disaster eventually produced a report that was so serious and specific about the numerous failures that caused the explosion that claimed 26 lives.
He named and assigned responsibilities and recommended changes to prevent it from happening again. Although no one was ever convicted of a crime, Judge Peter Richard left no doubt that the conduct of individuals and institutions, characterized as incompetent, deceptive, and apathetic, caused an avoidable disaster.
And he went further, finding that it should have been avoided.
Many years later, the commission investigating the 2020 Nova Scotia massacre seems to be on track to produce a report that is unlikely to answer the most basic questions from the public: how did it happen and why? Who in the RCMP was making decisions during and after the massacre and could have been avoided?
The commission’s general mandate, to focus on trauma, suggests that protecting feelings can prevent events.
From the outset, the RCMP has been on the defensive and in secret about its handling of the April 2020 events. The initial focus of the RCMP briefings was on its own lost members and wounded and in what was characterized as the heroic efforts of the agents who responded. .
But to be fair, this was not a triumph for the police, as one killer continued to kill, while the public was largely unaware of the threat.
It is not a sign of disrespect to analyze and question the actions of people who often heroically wear a service uniform. The uniform is not a shield of responsibility. And while it is true that feelings must be respected as words are analyzed and actions are critically reviewed, one cannot escape responsibility for those who have been tasked with protecting the public.
Assigning responsibilities is not a vengeful guilt.
In the case of the April 2020 events, many serious mistakes were made. One might think or expect that the RCMP leadership, and the people they report to, would be the first to want to know what went wrong, if they don’t already know.
Beyond insulting the memories of the dead and further damaging the emotions of their relatives, the misguided attempt to get the feelings out of the facts has provided oxygen to the already burning fire of suspicion of concealment.
The lack of information from the outset, the emphasis on mass murder as a police shooting, rather than the general carnage of the community, was the fire that fueled the fire of suspicion.
While the commission’s hearings have produced a slow drip of new information, most should have been made public a long time ago and could have been if it weren’t for the ease with which privacy is now used to perpetuate the secret.
Without even waiting to read the commission’s report, it seems likely to be rejected by some, and perhaps many, as a whitewash, part of a cover-up.
And unfortunately, it has taken a long time to achieve very little.
It’s not too late for commissioners to look at the example of the Westray investigation, assign responsibilities, and put the facts first.