The Dutch philosopher Spinoza said that “peace is not an absence of war, it is a virtue, a state of mind, a disposition to benevolence, trust, justice.” Russia’s atrocities and what we now know about Russian nationalism make the “peace” with Putin so defined is unassociable.
It is clear that for Putin and his ideologue Aleksandr Dugin, the crime in Ukraine was to refuse to be Russian despite being part of the sacred community of Cyrillic orthodoxy. Such is the defensiveness of this mentality, anyone who does not want to be Russian must think that he is better than the Russians. Therefore, they can be called Nazis.
Ukraine’s “crime” is shared with other countries that once belonged to Russia; Poland and Kazakhstan have been described as non-states by both former President Dmitry Medvedev and Putin. And there is nothing new in this imperial ambition and paranoia. As Alexander Borodai, a Donetsk separatist, puts it: “As Alexander III said, Russia’s allies are its army and navy. Unfortunately, we have no other natural allies. “
Therefore, the problem of Russian nationalism cannot be solved; must be managed. No treaty should be trusted. As Putin’s MP said in 2017, Russia is not governed by treaties; the treaties restrict the leader who must break them as soon as he can. Any agreement should be recognized as an agreement that can be insured against possible breaches. Which means we have to reconsider the peace dividend we took every nineties.
How could it be a solution to the current conflict? Zelensky has already offered to end his quest to become a member of NATO. What he wants in return is access to the EU. In terms of territory, Zelensky could accept the loss of Crimea, but a sustainable Crimea must have a land and freshwater refueling route. And Putin must abandon the Odessa coastline in Ukraine to allow it to export by sea. However, perhaps the rust belts of the Donbas, home of Russian speakers transported there, could be ceded to replace the millions of Ukrainians killed in Stalin’s Holodomor and World War II.
So the bones of an agreement are obvious: to change NATO for the EU, to cede the Russian-speaking areas of Ukraine and Crimea in exchange for a land corridor. In theory, this would achieve Putin’s war goals. It would leave Ukraine still viable, with export routes for its agricultural products. Rationally, that should be the end. And if so, Henry Kissinger is right to say that the role of Ukraine is to be a neutral buffer state rather than the border of Europe.
Unfortunately, Kissinger’s vision is now problematic. In fact, the problems with the proposal grow with each atrocity committed by Russia. Moreover, Russian nationalism means that the idea of a separate Ukrainian “neutrality” would now seem like a chimera. As one Polish historian observed in the 1930s, “without Ukraine, Russia is relegated to a northern desert.” That is why Putin’s negotiator Vladimir Medinsky may have said, “Russia’s very existence is at stake.” A successful Western-oriented economy on its border would also pose a real threat to the internal stability of the Russian regime.
The paradox is that the need for some kind of settlement is growing. Each side is fighting the other to the point of mutual destruction; neither a fully mobilized Ukraine nor a Russia that refuses to admit that it is at war has the resources to achieve its ultimate goals. Ukraine’s human resources are limited. Cracks are appearing in the Russian internal narrative; when a pop concert sings “F — the War” in Putin’s hometown, St. Petersburg, he should take note. These protesters are of the generation you need to fight in a war of attrition; and Russian demographics indicate a severe shortage of this age group. Western sanctions will be felt more and more. Likewise, the global response to the invasion, which is already erratic, shows fault lines that will widen as food and fuel shortages bite.
At some point, a compromise will have to be reached. And Zelensky will have to show as much wisdom in these negotiations as his people have shown courage in battle. But as we have left the struggle in Ukraine, we should let the Ukrainians decide where to make these commitments. Our role must be to secure any settlement and contain the expansive nationalism that provoked this war in the first place.
Major General Jonathan Shaw was Director of Special Forces in the British Army and Head of Cybersecurity at the Ministry of Defense